Journal of Economics

Analyze the main, in my opinion, the factors of degradation of the economics of the USSR, resulting already in 1960 and affecting up to now.

Megalomania. The growth of the country’s needs for skilled workers, scale economy, a huge increase in the state’s role in the economy contributed to the increased number of scientists, including economists. The number of scientists and economists has increased, probably dozens of times by the early 60′s. New researchers often ended their mediocre school, studied mostly in mediocre professors (best destroyed or they emigrated), not traveled abroad, foreign languages ​​often do not really know, original ideas were afraid to speak because of it punished. No one should be surprised that we had very few prominent scientists, economists, and the fact that they still were, and not only among the older generation.

In the 30 years in the Soviet Union was an organization of scientific activity, fundamentally different from the pre-revolutionary Russian and foreign, meaning it has not yet disclosed the full extent. Center of basic science rather than university has dragged under the tsars very precarious existence and maloavtoritetnaya Academy of Sciences, and in the field of applied science, instead of universities and corporations – industrial scientific research institutes subordinate to the commissariats. Such an organization is most consistent with the nature of the command economy and totalitarian society. Perhaps in the natural sciences and engineering, it really corresponds to the problem of borrowing of foreign scientific and technical achievements. And definitely, it helped to make science more manageable (“Controlled science” – so named his brilliant book on Soviet science A. Popovsky). But this system has cut the science of higher education and are involved in the degradation of both these areas. If in the natural sciences and technology, this reorganization and had some temporary advantages, for the social sciences – only disadvantages.

In the creation of large research groups in the social sciences Soviet leadership mechanical disseminate the lessons of natural sciences, while in the social sciences, including economic, nature of scientific work is fundamentally different and does not require the creation of large research groups. I’m in the 90 years of acquaintance with the activities of a number of Western (and, in 2005 – and Japanese), research centers, usually at major universities, according to Economics Research of the USSR and Russia, and nowhere in them the number of researchers did not exceed 5-6 persons ( Instead of hundreds of similar Soviet) that did not stop them producing a very skilled scientific work. Large number of employees of the organization demanded a large bureaucratic superstructure – very convenient for the quasi-scientific activity.

The enormous increase in the number of researchers are concentrated in large teams, in itself, with adverse consequences. Economists know the law of Gresham, according to which the equivalent reception of good and bad money bad money drives out good. The large number of mediocre and incompetent researchers, as an inevitable consequence of growth of their numbers, in large teams to create huge obstacles for scientific activity of strong academics. Recent research demonstrated the worthlessness of most of the rest of the staff, often from a sense of envy and rivalry have tried them on various pretexts (often – for ideological reasons) to get rid of that and often succeed.

Since the second half of the 50-ies in the USSR, the tendency to megalomania got stronger: there are many new research academic institutions, mostly academic, as well as the USSR State Planning Committee and the individual ministries. Although I have not met the comparative data on the number of scientists and economists in different countries, speak for the assumption that in the 60 years the Soviet Union occupied their number 2 spot in the world after the United States. Indirect evidence of this are huge numbers of economic journals in the period. In international research institutes, for example, were occupied by thousands of employees, which could not afford any other country except the United States.

Akademkraty. The complexity of the problem of selecting the heads of the major research groups was that the prominent scientists, as a rule, bad administrators, and do not aspire to administrative work. In addition, they usually have their own opinion and so poorly managed. And gradually, the power to choose the worst: has managed to grant administrative ranks of prominent scientists.

To better understand the changes in the management science Let us briefly recall the evolution relationship of Soviet power with the Academy of Sciences. The Soviet leadership was first thinking about its place in science and society in 1928, the eve of the first five years.Initially, the efforts of the Soviet regime were aimed mainly at increasing the loyalty of Soviet power, to which many academics regarded negatively. This explains the cruder forms of government interference in the electoral process of academics in 1929, It is concerned solely humanities department and ensure the inclusion of academics Communists, some of whom did not have significant scientific merit. It is important to note that the majority of the elected academicians, including all of the humanities, not led by scientific institutions, and many do not even have worked in academic institutions. The autumn of 1929 there was a cleaning staff of the Academy of Sciences, vice-president became a communist G. M. Krzyzanowski. So the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was “manageable”, and in 1930 began a shameful “academic work” on a number of scholars in the humanities for the final intimidation of academics and intellectuals.

Already in 1929, has been fundamentally solved the problem of choosing between universities and the Academy of Sciences as a center of science in favor of the latter. Three events contributed to a real transformation: Move it to Moscow in 1934, uniting with the Communist Academy, with its historical, philosophical and economic institutions in 1936 and the appearance in it of a technical institutes in 1937 As a result, its share in total budgetary expenditure science has grown from negligible 2% in 1929 to 24% in 1940.

Yet almost from the time of Peter the acting position that the scientific establishment at the Academy of Sciences found “in academics.”Almost all academic institutions of the Academy of Sciences in 1932 (48 of 51) were led by academics. But in the early 30′s scientific institutions were still very small in size (a maximum of 10-20 researchers) and the difficulty of managing so were slim.

The situation began to change, perhaps as early as the late 30′s, when the number of academic institutions has been rapidly increasing as the number of their employees. To solve the problem of management of these monsters, was a system of scientific nomenclature. If some scientists do not have major scientific merit, but it is manageable and has support in the leadership of the Academy of Sciences and the department of science of the CPSU Central Committee, first established institution under his leadership, and then the “pull” in the corresponding members and academics.

Unfortunately, we still have no true history of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, therefore, to ascertain the truth does not have to turn to the works of historians of science, memoirs, individual scholars, inevitably, to some extent subjective.

I will cite here the view the most prominent Soviet scientists of the period – Kapitza and Vernadsky. In his published diaries Vernadsky late 30-ies contain a lot of harsh criticism of management and staff of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, their methods of management science. Kapitsa was simply terrified by the scientific and intellectual level of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Estimating Soviet science at that time, he even believed that “the worst thing we Academia.

Academy of Sciences of the USSR in the 30 years lost its status as a self-governing organization, what it was before 1929 and turned into the usual bureaucratic organization, a cover elements of self-government (annual general meeting, election of academicians and corresponding members), like all Soviet society CPSU and the non-compliant with the Constitution and the Charter Committee. It came to the ridiculous: to approve the Secretary of its Laboratory, Vernadsky had to negotiate this issue in the personnel department of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences.

Low efficiency is very overgrown by mid-30′s scientific and educational spheres, and its inability to ensure the needs of complicated economic and social authorities realized relatively quickly. Hence, a sharp critic of the sphere in the press and very energetic efforts to rationalize it. Another thing is that these useful measures, begun in 1936, did not solve the main problems of organization of the scientific sector.

Place of academics in the management of Soviet science, including economic, has radically changed in the 50′s and 60′s. In fairness, I note that although the title of academician of profanity and its place in the management of science began when Stalin was alive, yet in the natural sciences and even in the economy was still had a crucial competence, academic merit.

Thus, even among economists, the overwhelming majority of academics were former Mensheviks and bourgeois specialists (Maslov, Strumilin, Trachtenberg). CPSU members among academics in the early 40′s were one. Academics, leaders of small-sized academic institutions (again, minus the philosophy) has been great scholars. Academy of Sciences in the field of personnel policy is thus an exception among Soviet social institutions.

Serious deviations from these features of the Academy was the election of 1943 Establishment Bar akademkratov (appropriate name, by analogy with partocracy invented by the journalist Alexander Salutskim) had multiple devastating consequences. The most important of them – moral discredit the scientific activity in the USSR. Instead of assessing the scientific merit cynically conducted a course on the evaluation of the degree of closeness to the authorities, and manageability. Moral failure since gone rapidly. Academics, directors of scientific institutions are becoming young kings, some of which formed the court attendants, sycophants, with its inherent royal courts of intrigue and podsizhivaniem. They are very much depended on the fate of the scientist: career development, access to the thesis defense, publishing, providing living space, obtaining travel, etc.

Fortunately, many institute directors were quite decent, civilized people and often created favorable conditions for scientific work, but it could not prevent the degradation of the system.

I note that while the weakness of academic economics, it was in this period, much higher than the university and industry, where all these shortcomings were more, and demands on the quality of research – much lower.

Isolation from the world of science. In the Stalinist period, making best efforts to limit the impact of global economics to Soviet. In poslestalincky period partly resumed participation of Soviet scientists in international conferences, scientific visits. Shire were transferred to the work of Western economists, including non-Marxist. The greatest impact on Soviet economists in terms of economic theory have translated a textbook on economic theory, Samuelson and Galbraith’s books. Translated a lot of concrete work on economic theory and practice of governance, economic-mathematical methods that have had a major impact on applied economic research. There were in the largest libraries of the USSR and the Western individual work on the Soviet economy, but only a handful of Soviet economists have used them in their studies.

Isolation of the Soviet economic science, its provincialism made it impossible to compare its performance with the world. Lack of opportunities (and needs) compared with the global level have created favorable conditions for the mediocre researchers and fruitless research groups. On a low estimate of Soviet scientists the world scientific community demonstrates the following, in my opinion, a very remarkable fact. The great economic historian Fernand Braudel modernity, describing in his famous three volumes Russian economy XVI-XVIII centuries, refers almost exclusively on the work of Western economists and Russian scientists emigrants.

Relatively advanced in that period of international contacts with scientists from the Soviet economists of the socialist countries have shown that compared with the experts from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Soviet economists were generally much weaker.

Economic and mathematical methods: a tragic mistake. From the late 1950′s the development of Soviet economic science growing influence exerted economic and mathematical methods. They have been used to a limited extent in economic research in the 20 years (the model of expanded reproduction, methods of mathematical statistics), but were convicted in 30-40-ies as a formalist, and virtually ceased. Their return in the late 50′s, due largely to the pioneering work of V. Novozhilov and L. Kantorovich, was associated with greater freedom in economic research, the discovery of new mathematical and economic methods, seemed to denote the new perspective (linear programming, inter-sectoral balance ) economic management, mathematics and reverence before the rapidly evolving in those years, computer technology.

Of course, economists and business executives aware of the primitiveness of the existing methods of planning and management, their inadequacy will become more difficult economy, as well as failure and weakness, the primitiveness of many of the traditional political economy. Thus, the emergence of a new scientific paradigm has fallen to a prepared public and scientific basis. And, as often happens, the shortcomings of the new paradigm not been seen or treated by her young, weak of exploration.

Already the first 10-15 years of economic-mathematical methods in the USSR quite clearly demonstrated that their ability to excessively exaggerated. The most important thing that laid the basis for many of these provisions were speculative. Economic and mathematical models are so simplified the reality that their use had no practical significance.

Criticism of the theoretical situation of many economic and mathematical research, very competently done by some Soviet economists of the older generation, was perceived as the conservatism and dogmatism. However, the apparent failure of the practical use of new techniques have prompted a number of bona fide supporters of this trend in early 1970 to address the traditional problems and methods of the economy. I’ll mention among them the same Igor Birman, after moving to the U.S. in the early 70′s never used them engaged, and VA Volkonsky.

Once again I quote from Igor Birman: “Smart Kantorovich closer to understanding the futility of our efforts, in autumn 1972 have read on my seminar paper on” the difficulty of applying linear programming “… health problems he outlined, the output does not have. Now, I think, does not have, because I understand that – it is not. According to the story close to it “pure” mathematics, in his last years, at the end, Kantorovich simulated economic-mathematical scientific activity “.

Meanwhile, economic-mathematical sciences in the USSR had already acquired the scientific and organizational inertia and intellectual respectability. Its leaders were awarded the Lenin Prize, and one of them – even the Nobel Prize in economics. Was created in Economics and Mathematics Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences and many departments in the industrial institutes, departments in universities, are protected by hundreds if not thousands, of theses on the subject. Gradually, researchers in this direction became dominant among academicians and corresponding members. Immense opportunities are started in the early 70-ies of the creation of automated control systems.

Harmful effects of such a broad use of economic-mathematical methods for the development of economic science in the Soviet Union was that, in this connection was made possible economists say, almost nothing is understood in the economy and real economic life. Formula overshadowed the economy.

Exceptions to the practical futility (if not harm) the application of many economic and mathematical methods have been, we can say the unit. The famous mathematician Glushkov clock for a long time watching nature of the business leaders at various levels. He had interesting economic ideas for improving the command economy. Very insightful writer Maxim Kalashnikov and economist Sergei Kugushev only appreciate the scientific merits and practical results of using economic and mathematical methods Pobiska Kuznetsova and Spartak Nikanorova. But just as the positive scientific results were rejected and concealed what happened to these scientists.

It should be noted that undue hypertrophy of the economic-mathematical methods was observed in Western countries, triggering protests from respected economists (the first of them was back in 1930 JM Keynes). Impact and influence of this already highly respected lines, and loss of performance criteria of economic science.

Perhaps one of the few positive aspects of this trend was the initiation of Soviet economists to world economics, albeit not very fruitful.Ironically, it was the representatives of this trend have played a decisive role in determining the economic policies during the adjustment period, because they took this time leading administrative positions in academic economics.

The disappearance of economic schools. Nauka, usually operates within the scientific schools, led by prominent scholars who produce original research methods and grouped around their students, continuing the tradition of this school after the death of the founders of these schools. Their existence in the period of Stalinism in economic science was impossible. After Stalin’s death, gradually began to emerge schools, or, rather, because of their insignificant size “nursery”, and in economics. They were at the Institute of Economics of the USSR around A. B. Notkin, J. B. Kvasha, engaged makroproportsiyami Soviet economy around C. A. Heynmana, who studied the internal structure of the economy, around YA Kronrod, had asserted trademark character of the Soviet economy. There was economic-mathematical school of Kantorovich. Was, as it would not assess school NA Tsagolov at Moscow State University, School of Moiseev on VTs AN SSSR, School of Glushkov. Several successful research schools were at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences. All of these schools (in varying degrees) is positively influenced the development of economic science in the USSR.

In the 70′s and 80 years, they began to disappear. Often the reason was the death of their founders – the students found themselves unable to follow their teachers. Often they are broken up as a school YA Kronrod. Death of scientific schools showed the weakness of the Soviet scientific community in economics. What is holding Western scientific school? First of all, on a high scientific credibility of their founders. Secondly, on his devotion to science students. In the USSR, the second factor was absent.