How did the weakness of economic science on the development of the Soviet economy?
Of course, the question arises: why, when almost continuously weakening economics Soviet economy sought to serious and even (1950), the brilliant economic success?
First of all, we should not exaggerate the role of economic theory in economic development. Here I am ready to join the opinion of Igor Birman, that the successes and failures as well as the American economy (and other economies) have little dependence on the state of economic science. Unified economic theory does not exist, various economic schools in different ways explain the economic reality and approach to economic policy. There is no way to determine the benefits of a school other than economic practices, which depends on many other factors. Much greater role in achieving practical results are mastering the methods of statistics and knowledge of economic history.
For all the weakness of economic theory, the level of industry-specific economic sciences was relatively high. In the Soviet Union was always a substantial number of economists, who knew and understood the economics of individual industries.
How did the Soviet leadership evaluated the competence of economists? Works, investigating the effectiveness of the Soviet government, and after 1991 there is little even after the opening of many archives. Particularly difficult to assess this issue in relation to the highest level of the Soviet leadership. Have therefore largely be judged by actions. We do not even know who were the economic advisers of Stalin on the Soviet economy, and whether in general or its reliance on the opinion of the authorities. In the late 20′s, he appreciated the outstanding Stats VS Nemchinov.
If judged by the nature of economic policy, it was quite elaborate, with the exception of 1929-1932. When only groped management command economy. But even in this period, making many good decisions for decades, determined the success of the Soviet economy.Mention the tax and credit reforms of the early 30′s, the improvement of the balance sheet method of planning, the establishment of the MTS. Fragmentary information in the economic literature on the history of making these decisions suggest that they were the initiators of practical high-ranking officials from the relevant (but not their first face).
From this we can conclude that the heads of many departments appreciate talented economists. The same is said on the eve of the war and the establishment of a number of departments of scientific and advisory bodies, including an exceptionally qualified economists of the old school. Many business leaders at various levels, as well as American owners and managers, not being versed in economic theory and other economic sciences, but having a lot of common sense and work experience, were able to understand many they want in economic categories and to evaluate their subordinates economists. My poor practical experience in enterprises and Economic Council in the early 60′s says that’s about it. Articles and books, memoirs of many Soviet mid-level business executives, published in the 60′s and 80′s, have more content than the product of many professional Soviet scientists.
Finally, the command economy proved to be quite viable, and sometimes (in the 50′s) and much better economies of the developed capitalist countries, not to mention the developing world. Cost, however, in the 60′s and 80 years to degrade personnel at all levels of economic management mechanism and dismantled the command economy to the common sense and experience of business leaders all weaker than offset the weakness of economic science.
The period after Stalin’s death until the late 60′s was a period of flourishing of Soviet economics and the beginning of a new decline.Contributed to the flourishing of three things: ease of ideological media, a significant expansion of the publication of statistics and the release from detention of a number of Soviet economists. Due to the obvious first two factors focus on the third. Affects the creative activity of prominent economists beginning of the twentieth century, have not lost at the conclusion of knowledge or creative activity – AL Vainshtein, Ya.B. Kvasha, C. A. Heynmana, C. A. Dalin. For only 5-7 years after release they issued a series of outstanding works of national economic accounting and statistics (Weinstein), Measurement of fixed assets (Kvasha), analysis of the effectiveness of the Soviet economy (Heynman), the economy of the capitalist countries (Dahlin).
In the same row, call subjected to sharp criticism in 1949 by L. Mendelssohn, published in the late 50′s – early 60′s expanded edition of the outstanding works on the history of the world economic crisis. Using the weakening of ideological press, Soviet economists have had a very informative discussion on the many political economy problems of the Soviet economy (especially the fate of the money and the commodity-money relations in socialism). Lively discussion of the theoretical findings published in the late 50′s books Kantorovich and VV Novozhilov. Came out very rich, with lots of factual material of the book staff of the newly created in 1957 by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Thanks to the many translations of works of foreign authors and the beginning of international scientific contacts between Soviet scientists re-acquainted with the writings of Western economists and a lot of useful of them borrowed. I venture in this state that the work of Weinstein, Heynmana, Kvasha, Mendelssohn and then not concede, and no better than the quality of the work of Western economists. These works there, unfortunately, was studied, mainly Sovietologists, which prevented their greater global popularity.
The intellectual potential of the Soviet economic science in the 60 years indicates that emigrated in the 70 years of Soviet scientists and economists is worthy look among Western Sovietologists. I especially want to note in this connection, IA Beermann, which is far more skillfully and shrewdly appraised during this period many of the phenomena of the Soviet economy.